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Jean-Paul Sartre, in Being and Nothingness, presents a long and com- 
plicated analysis of  human consciousness. In doing so he maintains two 
Cartesian theses about  consciousness. One is that consciousness is al- 
ways self-conscious even at the level of  what Sartre calls pre-reflective 
consciousness; for Sartre consciousness is always translucent. The 
second Cartesian thesis is that consciousness is infallible in terms of  
the beliefs it holds about  its own present states. In order to defend 
these two theses, Sartre collapses the distinction between an act or 
state of  consciousness and consciousness of  that act or state. For Sartre 
consciousness of  the table just is consciousness of  being conscious of  
the table. 1 On the other hand, Sartre needs to split apart consciousness 
even at the pre-reflective level because his distinction between the For- 
itself (human consciousness) and the in-itself (the rest of  the world) 
ultimately rests on his denial that the Law of  Identity applies to the 
For-itself. This paper wiI1 argue that he does not succeed in his a t tempt  
to hold both the Cartesian theses about  consciousness discussed above 
and the view that consciousness is not identical to itself. The reason his 
a t tempt  faiIs is that in order to maintain the unity of  pre-reflective 
consciousness, he rejects an analysis of  it in terms of  knowIedge. But 
in order to introduce duality into this unity, he iIlegitimately reintro- 
duces knowledge at the pre-reflective level. He acknowledges this 
problem but  dismisses it without offering a satisfactory resolution for 
his inconsistency. 
In section one o f  the paper I lay out  the arguments Sartre offers in 
the Introduct ion to Being and Nothingness to defend his view that the 
self-consciousness o f  the pre-reflective eogito is non-cognitive. In 
section two I argue that a key  set of  arguments Sartre uses to defend 
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his claim that the Law of  Identi ty fails to apply to the For-itself re- 
introduces cognitive elements into the pre-reflective cogito and is 
therefore inconsistent with what he has argued in the Introduction. 
In section three I examine how this same problem arises in Sartre's 
discussion o f  pure reflection. Finally in section four I summarize what 
I take to be one of  the central problems in Sartre's analysis of  self- 
consciousness. 
Sartre's defense of  both  Cartesian theses about consciousness rests on 
his collapsing of  the distinction between consciousness of  an object 
and consciousness of  being conscious of  an object. Sartre demands 
that there be a uni ty to consciousness even at the pre-reflective level. 
This uni ty is necessary for the translucency of  consciousness, that is, 
for consciousness to be self-conscious even at the pre-reflective level. 
He spells out  his argument for the self-intimating character of  con- 
sciousness in the Introduct ion to Being and Nothingness in which he 
discusses pre-reflective consciousness at length. For Sartre conscious- 
ness has no contents; it is empty.  There are no sense-data nor represen- 
tations in consciousness (BN 11). So introspection on the model of  
perception would fail. There are no contents of  consciousness to be 
perceived. The reason consciousness has introspective access to its own 
acts and objects is because it is its acts and objects. One should not, 
warns Sartre, conceive o f  self-consciousness at the pre-reflective level 
in the mode o f  subject/object, that is, from the point o f  view of  knowl- 
edge (knower/known).  There is no subject/object split in consciousness 
at the pre-reflective level. Consciousness of  consciousness is not "a 
knowledge o f  knowledge" (BN 12). If self-consciousness is thought  of  
at this level in terms of  knowledge, one ends up with reflection or 
positional consciousness of  consciousness or knowledge of  conscious- 
ness. On this analysis one act of  consciousness would be thought of  
as taking another  act o f  consciousness as its object. According to 
Sartre, this would lead to either an infinite regress or to an unconscious 
act o f  consciousness (BN 12). The reason for this is because if for an 
act of  consciousness to be pre-reflectively self-conscious, there must 
exist a further  act of  consciousness which takes the first act as its 
object, then, since the second act of  consciousness must also be self- 
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conscious, there must be a third act which takes this second act as its 
object. The same will be true for this third act and so on ad infinitum. 
On the other  hand, if one at tempts to stop the infinite regress at some 
point by denying self-consciousness to some one of  the acts of  con- 
sciousness in this series, then, Sartre thinks, one ends up with an un- 
conscious act of consciousness. Either outcome is absurd. Sartre con- 
cludes that "Consciousness is not  dual. If you wish to avoid an infinite 
regress, there must be an immediate, non-cognitive relation of  the self 
to itself" (BN 12, emphasis mine). This is what Sartre calls non-thetic 
or non-positional self-consciousness. "Every positional consciousness 
of  an object is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of  it- 
self" (BN 13). Sartre's by now famous example of  this point is the 
cigarette counting case. I am positionally conscious of  the cigarettes 
and their number,  but  I am only non-positionally conscious of  my 
counting the cigarettes. That is, I am explicitly aware of  the cigarettes, 
but  only implicitly or latently aware of  the activity of  counting. What 
this seems to come to for Sartre is that if asked what I were doing, 
I could reply "I 'm counting cigarettes." In other  words, if I were to 
reflect on what I was doing, I would be explicitly aware of  my  present 
state or activity or object of  consciousness. Reflection, however, has 
no primacy over pre-reflective consciousness for Sartre since pre-reflec- 
tive consciousness can exist without  reflective consciousness. Instead 
pre-reflective consciousness makes reflection possible. So the Cartesian 
cogito, Sartre argues, is not primary since the pre-reflective cogito is 
the condition for it. Although Sartre rejects the Cartesian cogito (or 
reflective consciousness) as the starting point or foundation for knowl- 
edge, he accepts the Cartesian thesis that all consciousness is trans- 
lucent, that is, self-conscious. But self-consciousness at the pre-reflec- 
tive level does not involve a subject (the knower) and an object (an 
act or mode of  consciousness). Rather consciousness of  an object just 
is consciousness of  being conscious o f  an object. Counting just is non- 
positional consciousness of  counting (BN 13). 
Sartre applies this analysis of  consciousness not  only to conscious- 
ness of  objects (tables, for example) but also to affective states such as 
intentions, pleasures and griefs. These, for Sartre, are not things in 
consciousness but  modes of  consciousness. As such, they are self- 
conscious. "An intention, a pleasure, a grief can exist only as immediate 
self-consciousness" (BN 14). But this self-consciousness is not a new 
consciousness. Sartre gives an extended analysis of  pleasure as a mode 
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of  consciousness. A pleasure just is consciousness of  a pleasure. Not 
in the sense that  there are two modes o f  consciousness: (1) a pleasure 
and (2) a consciousness of  pleasure as a separate consciousness. Rather 
pleasure and consciousness of  pleasure are logically indistinguishable. 
Sartre does not  want "conscious" to be a quality of  pleasure as " red"  
is a quality o f  the blotter, because then there could be one without 
the other. Just as there could be a blotter which lacks the quality o f  
redness, so too if "conscious" were a quality of  pleasure, then there 
could be pleasure without  that quality, that is, unconscious pleasure. 
Then pleasure and consciousness o f  pleasure would be logically - even 
if never in fact - distinct from each other. But for Sartre consciousness 
is nothing but its objects and states. Likewise, just as self-conscious- 
ness is not  a quality of  pleasure, so pleasure is not  a quality of  self- 
consciousness. There is not  first pleasure which then becomes con- 
scious nor consciousness which becomes pleasure. 
There is no more first a consciousness which receives subsequently 
the affect "pleasure" like water which one stains, than there is first 
a pleasure (unconscious or psychological) which receives subsequent- 
ly the quality of  "conscious" like a pencil o f  light rays. (BN 15) 
A pleasure and consciousness of  that pleasure are indivisible for Sartre. 
At the end of  this discussion of  the pre-reflective cogito in the Intro- 
duction o f  Being and Nothingness, Sartre notes that his point was to 
refute the Cartesian view that  favors the primacy of  knowledge and he 
wishes to argue instead for the primacy of  the being of  the knower. 
Consciousness is not, at the pre-refiective level, related to its expe- 
riences as knower  to known. Consciousness is not  related to its expe- 
riences at all; it is its experiences. It is nothing in itself (BN 17). He 
rejects the Cartesian view of  consciousness as a substance although he 
maintains the Cartesian thesis about the self-intimating character of  
consciousness. The reason he can do this is because he collapses the 
distinction between an act or mode of  consciousness and consciousness 




Sartre returns to a discussion of  the pre-reflective cogito in chapter 
two of  Part one of  Being and Nothingness. In this section Sartre is con- 
cerned with bad faith. After  examining the phenomenon o f  bad faith 
at some length, he begins to explore the conditions that allow for the 
possibility o f  bad faith. He argues that 
The condition of  the possibility of  bad faith is that human reality, in 
its most immediate being, in the intra-structure of  the pre-reflective 
cogito, must be what it is not  and not  be what it is. (BN 1 12) 
My concern here is not  with explicating Sartre's analysis of  bad faith. 
My focus is rather on his analysis of  belief in this section and his argu- 
ment  that the Law of  Identi ty does not  apply to belief. Belief or faith 
is central to an analysis of  both  bad and good faith. And Sartre finds 
that belief as a mode of  consciousness is both itself and not itself. There 
is an inner disintegration of  one's being involved in both bad and good 
faith. The reason for this is that belief even as a mode of  pre-reflective 
consciousness is not  what it is. Somehow a split occurs within the being 
of  consciousness itself; in this case its being as belief. This is because 
belief as a mode of  consciousness is self-conscious. That is, belief is 
consciousness of  belief. Here Sartre applies the Cartesian doctrine of  
self-intimation to belief. But a problem arises given the way he un- 
ravels this application. He uses for an example of  belief my  believing 
that Pierre feels friendship for me. "If  I believe that my  friend Pierre 
likes me, this means that his friendship appears to me as the meaning 
of  all his acts. Belief is a particular consciousness of  the meaning of  
Pierre's acts" (BN 1 14). In this case belief points outward toward Pierre 
and his acts. However, "if  I know that I believe, the belief appears to 
me as pure subjective determination without  external correlative" (BN 
1 14, emphasis mine). But since pre-reflective consciousness is self- 
conscious, then belief and consciousness of  belief must be one and the 
same. Yet Sartre wants to introduce a split here; but to do so he re- 
introduces knowledge into the self-consciousness o f  pre-refleetive 
consciousness. 
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To believe is to know that one believes, and to know that one be- 
lieves is no longer to believe. Thus to believe is not to believe any 
longer because that is only to believe - this is the unity of  one and 
the same non-thetic consciousness. (BN 1 14, emphasis mine) 
He wants to claim that belief is and is not what it is. Belief is belief 
but because it is self-conscious it is not  belief. Once I know that I be- 
lieve somehow I see it as purely subjective and so my belief is under- 
mined; it is no longer directed outward toward its object. But Sartre 
has here introduced considerations of  knowledge. In the introduction, 
however, we have seen that he clearly rejects an analysis of  the self- 
consciousness of pre-reflective consciousness in terms of  knowledge. 
He acknowledges that he has "forced the description of  the phenome- 
non [of belief] by designating it with the word to know; non-thetic 
consciousness is not  to know"  (BN 1 14). Yet he dismisses this inconsis- 
tency on his part by repeating his claim that pre-reflective conscious- 
ness in its translucency is at the origin of all knowledge. From that 
fact alone he concludes that "thus the non-thetic consciousness (of) 
believing is destructive of  belief" (BN 1 14). 2 His argument here seems 
to amount  to the following: Since pre-reflective consciousness is the 
origin of  knowledge, knowledge is involved in the self-consciousness 
of  pre-reflective consciousness; so pre-reflective consciousness is some- 
how fractured within itself. But this argument won' t  work, for the very 
reasons Sartre has given in his Introduction. It does not follow that 
because the pre-reflective cogito is primary and underlies knowledge 
that it is a knowing consciousness in terms of  itself. Pre-reflective 
consciousness does not know itself, although it is self-conscious. 
What self-consciousness comes to at this level, at least according to the 
extended analysis Sartre has given us earlier, is that if consciousness 
reflects upon itself it will then become explicitly aware that it is con- 
sciousness of  a table or of  cigarettes, for example. Prior to reflection, 
however, considerations of  knowledge do not arise. For the Sartre of  
the Introduction,  pre-reflective consciousness is non-cognitive. And 
yet it is the introduction of  knowledge into the translucency of the pre- 
reflective cogito which underlies, at least in this section, his argument 
that "'to believe is not  to believe" (BN 1 14). 
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B. 
Immediately after his discussion of  bad faith and belief, Sartre returns 
to an analysis of  non-thetic self-consciousness. In the first section o f  
chapter one in part two o f  Being and Nothingness which deals with 
the immediate structures of  the For-itself, he argues again that the Law 
of  Identi ty does not  apply to consciousness even at the level of  the pre- 
reflective cogito. He supports this by a further analysis of  belief and 
argues that since consciousness even at the pre-reflective level is self- 
conscious, then belief because it is consciousness (of) belief is not 
identical to itself. He offers an argument to support this claim that is 
similar to the one he offered in the section on bad faith. Since the pre- 
reflective eogito is a necessary condition for reflection then it must 
share its structure. Since reflection alters that which is reflected upon, 
the self-consciousness o f  the pre-reflective cogito must also alter its 
being and duality is introduced into consciousness even at the pre- 
reflective level (BN 121). Since reflective consciousness exists for 
itself as a witness, pre-reflective consciousness must somehow exist as 
a witness to itself as well and "thus by the sole fact that my  belief is 
apprehended as belief, it is no longer only belief; that is, it is already 
no longer belief, it is troubled belief" (BN 121). For Sartre, conscious- 
ness (of) belief irreparably alters belief. But that can only be so if 
belief couM exist without consciousness (of) belief, that is, without  
self-awareness as one of  its properties. But that is impossible on Sartre's 
view. Consciousness even at the pre-reflective level must be self-con- 
scious. Belief is not  belief; it is consciousness (of) belief. Although he 
acknowledges that  since it is part of  the very being of  belief that it be 
self-conscious, that it "can exist only as troubled,"  he still concludes 
that it "exists from the start as escaping itself" (BN 122). But if from 
the start what it is is self-conscious, then how does it escape what it 
is by the results of  its self-consciousness? His collapsing o f  the distinc- 
tion between belief and consciousness (of) belief at the pre-reflective 
level undermines his a t tempt  to pry them apart again at this same 
level. 
Sartre moves to block what he sees as another at tempt  to reintro- 
duce identity into pre-reflective consciousness. Against those who 
would hold that consciousness (of) belief is identical to consciousness 
(of) belief he reasserts his argument from the Introduction that con- 
sciousness (of) belief cannot be distinct from belief or one becomes 
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involved in an infinite regress of  acts of  consciousness (BN 121). If  
consciousness (of) belief is an act o f  consciousness separate from belief, 
then there must be a third act o f  consciousness which would be con- 
sciousness (of) ((consciousness (of) belief)). That is, if to say that pre- 
reflective consciousness as belief is self-conscious means that there is 
an act of  consciousness which takes belief as its object, then for that  
second act to be self-conscious, there must be a third act which takes 
the second act as its object and so on to infinity. Sartre thinks that if  
you take consciousness (of) belief to be identical to itself that  you must 
also maintain that it is separate from belief and so become involved in 
this regress. 
Sartre concludes after these arguments that belief is not  belief and 
consciousness (of) belief is not  consciousness (of) belief. Rather belief 
is consciousness (of) belief. That is, belief as a mode of  consciousness 
is self-conscious. I must admit I still fail to see how it follows from the 
fact that self-awareness is a property of  pre-reflective consciousness 
(BN 121) that an act o f  consciousness at the pre-reflective level, such as 
belief, is not  itself. It does not  follow from the claim that belief is belief 
that it is not  self-conscious. Just as it would not  follow from the claim 
that  water is water that it is not  fluid. Likewise an infinite regress 
would not  follow from the claim that consciousness (of) belief is con- 
sciousness (of) belief unless one removes the parentheses and moves to 
the level of  reflective consciousness. But if one does not  take self- 
consciousness at the pre-reflective level to involve consciousness taking 
itself as an object, then the regress does not  begin. Self-aware belief 
just is self-aware belief. What worries Sartre, of  course, is that his dis- 
t inction between the For-itself and the In-itself rests on the fact that 
the For-itself is not  what it is while the In-itself is what it is. The For- 
itself is not  identical to itself. It is Sartre's analysis of  being in the first 
part of  Being and Nothingness which brings him to this claim. What 
follows is a very brief summary o f  that  analysis. Sartre first raises the 
question of  being and then sees that to be able to question is a human 
att i tude and that questions can have negative as well as positive an- 
swers. So one could not  ask a question especially with regard to being 
unless negation existed. Negation is possible only because of  non-being. 
But you cannot derive non-being from being in itself and yet  it cannot 
come from itself since it is non-being. So the only origin of  non-being, 
nothingness, must be a being which is its own nothingness, that is, the 
For-itself. At least part of  what Sartre means when he claims that the 
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For-itself is a being that is its own nothingness is that the For-itself is 
self-conscious. That is why he needs to show that self-consciousness 
introduces non-being into consciousness. One way he does this is to 
argue that the Law of Identity fails to apply to the For-itself. However, 
the arguments he puts forth in this section to support this claim are 
weak. In the next section of this paper, I want to look carefully at his 
analysis of  self-consciousness at the pre-reflective level which he offers 
immediately after this discussion of belief. 
C. 
A central concept in Sartre's analysis of the self-consciousness of the 
pre-reflective cogito is presence. 3 Sartre argues that consciousness is 
present to itself even at the pre-reflective level. There are two ways to 
interpret this thesis, however. I will call these two ways the weak and 
strong versions of the thesis. Given the weak version of the thesis that 
pre-reflective consciousness is present to itself, the thesis coincides with 
his discussion of the self-consciousness of the pre-reflective cogito 
presented in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness. However, 
given the strong version of the thesis, Sartre is guilty of once more 
introducing considerations of knowledge at the pre-reflective level. 
But Sartre needs to put forth the strong version of the thesis in order 
to defend his claim that duality enters into the unity of the pre-reflec- 
tive cogito and so the Law of Identity fails to apply to the For-itself 
even at the most primary level of consciousness. In doing so he relies 
on a notion of presence that he utilizes later in Being and Nothingness 
in his discussion of knowledge. 
Sartre argues that since consciousness (of) self at the pre-reflective 
level is the foundation for self-consciousness and self-knowledge at 
the reflective level, consciousness must be present to itself from the 
beginning. The weak version of the claim that consciousness is present 
to itself even on the pre-reflective level would amount to a restatement 
of the claim Sartre put forward in the Introduction. That is the claim 
that consciousness of an object just is consciousness of being conscious 
of an object. That is why when asked what one is thinking or doing, 
one can answer. On this view one is implicitly present to one's acts of 
consciousness and can become explicitly present through reflection. 
However, on this version the unity of pre-reflective consciousness 
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would remain undisturbed. Presence to oneself would follow from the 
fact that being conscious of an object is the same as being conscious of 
being conscious of an object. But Sartre wants t o  argue once again 
that there is a duality, a fracturing, within the pre-reflective cogito. 
To do so he introduces a notion of presence that is spelled out most 
clearly in the section on Transcendence which deals with the nature 
of knowledge. Knowledge, Sartre argues in this section, is the presence 
of consciousness to things (BN 240) and presence involves negation. 
Non-being is an essential structure of presence. Presence encloses a 
radical negation as presence to that which one is not. What is present 
to me is what is not me. (BN 241) 
Thus to know an object requires that one not be the object. Knowledge 
involves negation, a separation of the knower from the known. It is 
this notion of presence which leads him, I think, to claim that for 
consciousness to be present to itself it must not be itself. "The law of 
the for-itself, as the ontological foundation of consciousness, is to be 
itself in the form of presence to itself" (BN 124). Presence involves 
duality and separation and so "the presence of being to itself implies a 
detachment on the part of being in relation to itself .... If being is pres- 
ent to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself" (BN 124). Sartre, of 
course, realizes that he must maintain the unity of pre-reflective con- 
sciousness or he will reintroduce the Cartesian subject/object duality 
into that level of  consciousness, a duality he rejected in the Introduc- 
tion. Unless Sartre maintains that belief is consciousness (of) belief, 
for example, the possibility arises that there could be something in 
consciousness of which consciousness is unaware; that is, an unconsci- 
ous act of consciousness. To avoid this possibility, Sartre holds to his 
earlier claim that there is no distinction between an act of conscious- 
ness and consciousness of that act. 4 To maintain this unity and the 
duality presence to oneself entails, Sartre argues that what separates 
consciousness from itself at the pre-reflective level is nothing. But he 
can't have it both ways. If we take his claim seriously that nothing 
separates an act of  consciousness from consciousness of that act, 
then the distance and separation involved with the notion of presence 
developed in the section on knowledge does not apply. The unity re- 
mains undivided. Just as he failed to argue successfully for the lack of 
identity between belief and consciousness (of) belief given his analysis 
of the unity of pre-reflective consciousness in the Introduction, so here 
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his at tempt to drive a wedge between consciousness and itself at the 
pre-reflective level fails, s The only way to drive such a wedge is to 
move to the level o f  reflective consciousness. 
III 
The problems that arise for Sartre in his a t tempt  to introduce duality 
into the u n i t y  of  pre-reflective consciousness arise again, although 
with a slightly different twist, in his discussion of  pure reflection. At 
the level o f  pure reflection Sartre wishes to maintain the Cartesian 
thesis that introspective awareness is infallible. 6 To do so, he must 
collapse the distinction between reflective consciousness and the  
consciousness it reflects upon. Yet " to  the extent  that  reflection is 
knowledge" (BN 213), he must pry the two apart again. This is the 
problem he confronts at the beginning of  the final section on the 
temporal i ty of  the For-itself in Part two, chapter two of Being and 
Nothingness. We cannot think of  reflective consciousness as separate 
from the consciousness it reflects upon, Sartre argues, or else reflec- 
tive consciousness will possess at most an image or representation of  
the act o f  consciousness reflected upon (BN 213). This would be 
similar to accepting a perceptual model  o f  introspection. Just as in 
perception (construed on a Cartesian model)  one has a representation 
of  the object  perceived, so in introspection conceived of  on a percep- 
tual model, reflective consciousness would possess onIy a representation 
of  the consciousness reflected upon,  a sensation of  a sensation so to 
speak. But then the kind of  scepticism and lack of  certainty which 
haunts the Cartesian view of perception would also haunt this view of  
introspection as a kind of  quasi-perceiving. "Reflective knowledge and 
in particular the cogito would lose their certainty and would obtain 
in exchange only a certain probability,  scarcely definable" (BN 213). 
In order to maintain the infallibility thesis then Sartre claims that 
"reflection - if it is to be apodictic evidence - demands that the 
reflective, be that which is reflected-on" (BN 213). Sartre claims that 
there  is a bond of  being between reflective consciousness and the con- 
sciousness reflected upon. The one is the other. But for there to be 
knowledge at the level of  pure reflection, reflective consciousness must 
be separate from the consciousness reflected upon. So the reflective 
must be and not  be the reflected-on. However,  as Sartre begins to 
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explicate his claim that there is knowledge at the level of pure reflec- 
tion, he realizes he must modify the claim to maintain the unity 
between reflective consciousness and the consciousness reflected 
upon. In ordinary cases of knowledge, the knower and the object of 
knowledge are separate. One is not the other. "To know is to make one- 
self  other" (BN 218). But that cannot be the case with reflective knowl- 
edge since the consciousness reflected upon just is the reflective con- 
sciousness. So Sartre says that the consciousness reflected upon is only 
a quasi-object for reflection since the reflected upon cannot be viewed 
from the outside, from a point a view, given the unity of being that 
exists between reflective consciousness and consciousness reflected 
upon. Since the two pull apart from each other but not sufficiently 
to actually be two, reflective knowledge cannot be ordinary knowl- 
edge. Rather, according to Sartre, it is "a lightning intuition ... every- 
thing is given at once in a sort of absolute proximity" (BN 218). Later 
in this same discussion Sartre weakens even further his claim that pure 
reflection is knowledge and claims that it is "a recognition rather than 
knowledge" (BN 219). It differs from ordinary knowledge in that there 
is no real object of  knowledge in reflection but only a quasi-object 
since it is what it 'knows' and there are no surprises with reflective 
'knowledge' again since there is no transcendent object of  knowledge. 
Still later in the discussion he says "pure reflection is never anything 
but a quasi-knowledge" (BN 226). The direction of the tension in this 
section between Sartre's need to assert the unity within consciousness 
and his need to argue for its duality is the reverse of its direction in 
his discussion of the pre-reflective cogito. There, in order to defend his 
claim that there is duality even in the unity of pre-reflective conscious- 
ness, he illegitimately introduces cognitive elements into the discussion 
of consciousness at that level. Here, in order to reassert the unity of 
consciousness at the level of pure reflection, he weakens and at times 
abandons his claim that pure reflection is knowledge. 
IV 
The problem here and in the earlier discussion is that in order to defend 
the Cartesian doctrines of self-intimation and infallibility, Sartre col- 
lapses the distinction between states or acts of consciousness and con- 
sciousness of those states or acts. He argues for the unity of conscious- 
ness at the pre-reflective level and at the level of  pure reflection. Yet 
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in order to defend his claim that the Law of  Identity fails to apply to 
the For-itself, he introduces duality into consciousness even at the pre- 
reflective level and in doing so introduces cognitive elements as well. 
He wants to reject the Cartesian primacy of  knowledge and yet main- 
tain the Cartesian doctrines of  self-intimation and infallibility. But his 
attempt,  at least in the set of  arguments I have been examining, fails. 
Any at tempt on his part to pull apart acts or states of  consciousness 
from consciousness of  those acts or states weakens his defense of  the 
two Cartesian doctrines. But if he maintains the absolute unity of the 
two, then the distinction between the In-itself and the For-itself begins 
to collapse. The problem Sartre is dealing with here is the problem of  
self-consciousness. On the one hand, how can consciousness have the 
kind of  intimacy it does with itself, the kind of  intimacy captured by 
the Cartesian doctrines of  self-intimation and infallibility, unless it is 
itself?. On the other hand, how can self-consciousness be consciousness 
of self unless there is a distance between consciousness and self?. Sartre 
tries to solve this enduring puzzle about self-consciousness by prying 
apart the act or state of  consciousness from consciousness of that act 
or state just long enough to insert nothingness between the two before 
they snap together again. I think this move, though it may capture the 
puzzlement self-consciousness gives rise to, fails to solve the puzzle. 
I have been looking only at one key set of  arguments Sartre ad- 
vances to defend his claim that the For-itself is not identical to itself 
and I claim that those arguments are inconsistent with his collapsing 
of  the distinction between acts or states of  consciousness and con- 
sciousness of  those acts or states. Sartre, of  course, advances many 
other arguments in Being and Nothingness to defend his claim that the 
For-itself fails to coincide with itself. His defense of  this claim is at the 
heart of  his analysis of  human consciousness and the way in which it is 
distinct from the world. One way in which he explicates this claim 
about the inapplicability of  the Law of  Identity to the For-itself is to 
argue that all consciousness is self-consciousness. My contention is 
that the set of  arguments he gives to defend this explication fails. ~ 
Limitations of  space prevent me from examining whether Sartre suc- 




I. Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: 
Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 11. All future references to this work will 
be followed in the text by BN and the page number. 
2. Sartre explains in the Introduction that he uses parentheses around de in con- 
science de soi because in speaking of self-consciousness at the pre-reflective 
level he does not want the expression de sol to indicate knowledge. At the pre- 
reflective level consciousness does not take itself (i.e., its acts or modes) as an 
object. Yet  in this discussion of belief he talks of knowing that one believes at 
the pre-reflective level and yet he still uses the parentheses. This ambiguity 
in Sartre's analysis reappears in his discussion of knowledge at the level of 
pure reflection. 
3. By way of introducing this discussion of the Forqtself's presence to itself, 
Sartre discusses the use of the reflexive pronoun (in French and Latin) used 
in locutions such as "il s'ennuie" (BN 123). Sartre's brief discussion here is 
akin to more recent discussions of what has come to be known as the he- 
himself problem. Hector-Neri Castafieda first raised this problem in analytic 
philosophy in a series of articles in the late sixties and the discussion has been 
continued more recently by John Perry and others as well as by philosophers 
interested in cognitive science and AI research. Issues of self-reference are 
at the heart of these discussions. 
4. The problem Sartre wrestles with here is reflected in a recent debate between 
D.M. Armstrong and Sydney Shoemaker on the nature of consciousness and 
introspection. Armstrong argues in Consciousness and Causality (Oxford, 
England: Basil Blackwell, 1984) that we should conceive of the introspective 
awareness that each person has of her own mind on the model of perception. 
Just as a person can become aware of objects in the world and the states and 
locations of those objects through perception, so she can become aware of the 
acts and states of her own mind through a kind of inner perception. This view 
of introspection rests on a distinction which Armstrong defends most clearly 
in A Materialist Theory o f  the Mind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968). 
It is a distinction he draws between a state of consciousness and awareness of 
that state. For Armstrong, pain and awareness of pain, e.g., are, in his own 
words, "distinct existences." He maintains that the "awareness (perception) 
of inner mental states by the person whose states they are ... is simply a further 
mental state, a state 'directed' towards the original inner state" (p. 94). What 
follows from his 'distinct existences' theory is a rejection of the two Cartesian 
theses Sartre accepts. In "Introspection and the Self," Midwest Studies in 
Philosophy, vol. x, ed. Peter A. Finch, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard 
K. Wettstein (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), Shoemaker 
mounts a sustained attack against the perceptual model of introspection. His 
attack of Armstrong's view rests in part on his collapsing, as Sartre does, the 
distinction between an act or state of consciousness and awareness of that 
act or state. Shoemaker argues in the same vein in Personal Identity (Oxford, 
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UK: Basil Blackwell, 1984) that the capacity for being conscious of states of 
consciousness within oneself, such as beliefs and desires, is inseparable from the 
capacity for having those states. It is of the essence of  at least certain mental 
states that they produce self-knowledge, a knowledge which is not  mediated by 
anything like sense impressions. For  Shoemaker, as well as for Sartre, being in a 
mental  state (at least of  a certain kind for Shoemaker) and being aware of that  
state are not  logicially independent.  
5. It is the ambiguity of  Sartre's analysis of  the self-consciousness of pre-reflec- 
t ire consciousness that confuses some of  his critics. Marjorie Grene, for exam- 
ple, in Sartre (New York: New Viewpoints,  1973) attacks Sartre's defense of 
the Cartesian doctrine that  it is a necessary condit ion for consciousness that  it 
be self-conscious. She takes non-thetic consciousness of  self as something dif- 
ferent from consciousness of an object.  But for Sartre in the Introduct ion to 
Being and Nothingness consciousness of  the table and consciousness of  being 
conscious of the table are one and the same. He has collapsed the distinction 
between the two and so being self-conscious at the pre-reflective level does not  
interfere with being conscious of the world. In fact they are the same; there is 
only one act of consciousness. She argues against Sartre that  it is consciousness' 
"lack of  consciousness of  itself, its ' ignorance'  of  itself if you will, that  makes 
it conscious" (p. 120). She has separated consciousness of self from conscious- 
ness of  the world at the pre-reflective level. But Sartre would reject that separa- 
tion. I think, however, that  it is Sartre's illegitimate introduct ion later in Being 
and Nothingness of elements of knowledge at the pre-reflective level, his intro- 
duction of duality into pre-reflective consciousness that  is, that might have 
pushed Grene to interpret  him in the way she does. 
6. Sartre wants to defend this Cartesian thesis while maintaining, against Des- 
cartes, that  consciousness is temporal  at every level of its existence, including 
the level of pre-reflective consciousness and pure reflection. For  Descartes 
what self-consciousness apprehends is a momentary ,  instantaneous self, a mo- 
ment of consciousness. For  Sartre self-consciousness apprehends an histori- 
cized self, embodying a past and directed toward a future. 
7. Apart  from the problems I have been examining in this paper, there are further 
problems that  arise for anyone who holds that  all consciousness is self-con- 
sciousness. Split brain patients,  people with multiple personalities, dreamers, 
those under hypnosis, sleepwalkers have all been presented as cases that stand 
as prima facie counter-examples to the thesis that all states of consciousness 
involve self-consciousness. Because of limitations of space, I cannot examine 
whether Sartre could handle these kinds of cases and if he could how he would 
do so. 
